ABSTRACT. We propose an allocation mechanism for publicly providing a private good such that the final allocation is simultaneously independent of income and increasing in strength of preference or need. The "pay or wait" mechanism consists of offering the good for sale at two outlets. The 'queuing' outlet would charge a low money price per unit, but high waiting timer per unit. The 'pricing' outlet would charge a relatively high money price with rapid service. High wage individuals will opt for the pricing outlet, and low wage individuals the queuing outlet. If the policy maker stocks the outlets in proportion to the distribution of high and low wage earners in the population, consumers of both wages will purchase the same amount on average, while those who value the good more relative to other goods will receive more of it. These outcomes are at risk if the good can be privately resold, but may be preserved if the policy maker can create transactions costs associated with resale.
Introduction
When it comes to society's concern over consumption inequality, some goods are more equal than others. As Tobin observed in 1970, our general acceptance of inequality is tempered for those commodities 'essential to life and citizenship,' such as early education, emergency health care, voting, government services, food in times of crisis, park or beach access, and so on. Traditionally, economists have been wary of distributional concerns over specific private goods ('paternalism'), and of the public provision of such goods for redistributive purposes. It was commonly argued that distributional concerns motivated by utilitarian social welfare could be met at least cost by redistributing income from rich to poor, and then allowing market prices to allocate resources to their most valued uses (the Second Welfare Theorem).
Nonetheless, two changes since 1970 have increased the attention economists have paid to public in-kind provision. First, good-specific distributional concerns have proved sufficiently robust over time that some economists suggest they be taken seriously as public policy objectives (Weitzman, 1977; Rosen, 2002, p. 175) . For example, compulsory public health insurance in Canada, implemented federally in 1968, was reviewed in 2002 and justified in part on the basis that Canadians want the poor to have the same access to health care as the rich (Romanow Commission, 2002, p. xvi) . Tobin (1970) was the first to characterize such non-welfarist objectives as specific egalitarianism. Rationing scarce health services by queues rather than price seems acceptable from this view, because time is more equally distributed than earnings ability or wealth (Nichols, Smolensky and Tideman, 1971) .
A second change within economics leading to a focus on in-kind provision has been the incorporation of imperfect information into standard welfare economics.
Goods like health insurance may not be available to all in private markets if providers cannot distinguish high and low risk individuals. Government provision of uniform compulsory insurance may thus be welfare-improving (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) .
Similarly, charities or governments may create a 'samaritan's dilemma', or form of moral hazard where individuals correctly anticipate that if they under-invest in precautionary goods when young, they will be rescued from bad outcomes later in life. Thus people under-save and under-insure (Bruce and Waldman, 1991) . Most importantly, governments may be unable to distinguish high from low ability workers, and thus face restrictions on the degree of redistribution possible through optimally designed tax systems. This is because individuals with high ability may mimic those with low ability in order to avoid taxes or qualify for cash transfers (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988; Boadway and Marchand, 1995; and Blomquist and Christiansen, 1997) . Unknown risk, moral hazard, and unknown ability have all been used to identify conditions under which social welfare could be higher if certain private goods were publicly provided at a uniform level to all.
Our paper draws on both of the above considerations to propose an in-kind redistributive mechanism that recognizes self-selection constraints for high and low ability individuals. The redistributive objective we consider is commodity-specific egalitarianism. Specific target goods such as elective health care, government services, secondary disaster relief, or access to national parks or campgrounds could be made available through parallel outlets that ration by different combinations of price and time. A policy maker, by choosing the allocation of the good and its money (or time) price across outlets, can ensure that individuals self-select outlets by their earnings ability. Those with a relatively high earnings ability will choose outlets that ration more by paying than by waiting, and vice versa. Under conditions we identify, our mechanism can achieve specific egalitarianism, ensuring that individuals with a given strength of preference for the target good will purchase the same amount regardless of income, while those who value it more highly relative to other goods will purchase more than those who value it less.
Of course, any use of time as an allocation device involves the waste of an otherwise valuable resource. There is then inescapably an efficiency cost to the 'pay or wait' redistribution mechanism we propose. It is beyond the scope of this paper to compare the tradeoff between equity and efficiency achieved by this mechanism with that achieved by more traditional tax and transfer systems under imperfect information. Rather, we focus on the distributional properties that a 'pay or wait' mechanism can achieve, with and without the potential for private resale. We note heuristically how efficiency costs can be minimized, and refer interested readers to Clark and Kim (2005) for greater detail. 1 The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the distributional and efficiency aspects of queuing as a redistributive mechanism. Section 3 provides a formal model of our allocation mechanism, with and without the potential for resale, and with the introduction of preference heterogeneity. We conclude in Section 4.
Waiting for Godot
As noted by Nichols et al. (1971) , Barzel (1974) , O'Shaughnessy (2000) , and Alexeev and Leitzel (2001) , allocating goods that are deemed essential to citizenship or life using queues rather than price can seem appealing in an egalitarian sense, because time is more evenly distributed than human or physical capital, or income.
Economists, in contrast, have criticized queuing on two major efficiency grounds. First, buyers who wait in line are surrendering a valuable resource, time, that unlike money does not get transferred to the seller. The opportunity cost of that time includes not just leisure, but forgone production. Thus, widespread queuing for goods in an economy would ultimately make fewer of these goods available.
Secondly, the time price of queuing penalizes those with a higher opportunity cost of time. When compared to money pricing, queuing will thus transfer goods from some who value them more to others who value them less (Tobin, 1970; Suen, 1989; and O'Shaugnessy, 2000) . Far better to meet distributional concerns at a general level with a tax and transfer system, and then allocate private goods by price and congestible public services with user fees set at marginal social cost.
As previously pointed out, however, imperfect information means that tax and transfer systems carry their own distortions in work disincentives (Tobin, 1970; Bucovetsky, 1984) and imperfect targeting (Alexeev and Leitzel, 2001) . Similarly, user fees for congestible public services may have regressive distributional effects (Nichols et al., 1971) . In response, a number of studies have compared the efficiency of alternative re-distributional instruments, such as tax/transfers, in-kind transfers, queuing, or rationing with resale (Bucovetsky, 1984; Sah, 1987; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988; Polterovich, 1993; O'Shaugnessy, 2000; and Alexeev and Leitzel, 2001 ). In general, if re-sale is not practical, the inefficiency of queuing must be traded-off against the inefficiency of allocating uniform quantities of a good to heterogeneous people.
Alternatively, Nichols et al. (1971) had a key insight that if people could choose whether to pay by money or by time, much of the re-distributional potential of allocation by time could be preserved, and its inefficiency reduced. Indeed, private firms with a degree of monopoly power commonly sell goods using a menu of price / wait combinations as a form of second degree price discrimination to increase profits (Tirole, 1988) . Governments could do the same with a target good of interest, but to pursue distributional ends such as specific egalitarianism. Low wage individuals would self-select to pay by time, while those with a high wage would self-select to pay by money. If wage captures the opportunity cost of time, and differences in wages reflect differences in marginal product, then the time lost in queues would have low foregone cost in wages and production. The costly and error-prone apparatus of means testing individuals would be unnecessary.
While Nichols et al. (1971) provided no formal model of parallel markets, O'Shaugnessy (2000) and Alexeev and Leitzel (2001) have when comparing social welfare under such systems with that under conventional tax and transfer systems.
Both of these studies consider general equilibrium production economies in which households value leisure and a single consumption good. Households may purchase the consumption good either at a subsidized price with a queue, or at a higher free market price without a queue. O'Shaugnessy (2000) finds that the tradeoff between mean consumption and its inequality may be better under differential pricing than a tax and welfare system. However, the tradeoff between mean utility and its inequality would favour the tax and welfare system. In contrast, Alexeev and Leitzel (2001) find that the tradeoff between mean utility and its inequality may favour parallel markets over lump sum taxes and transfers when the latter are imperfectly targeted.
Interestingly, both papers find that parallel markets gain an advantage over tax and transfers as the social planner increases the weight on inequality relative to mean consumption (O'Shaugnessy) or income (Alexeev and Leitzel).
Our approach differs from O'Shaugnessy (2000) and Alexeev and Leitzel (2001) in that we ask whether parallel markets can achieve the particular distributional objective of specific egalitarianism, or that the consumption of a target good be independent of income, but dependent on strength of preference. We thus divide their models' single consumption good into a target good, and a remaining composite commodity over which society has no distributional concerns. We also differ in allowing preference or need for the target good to vary across the population.
Finally, we differ in allowing the policy maker the extra degree of freedom of setting a money price in both parallel outlets, and through this the ability to create or preclude queuing in the outlet targeted to the rich.
Our model
Consider an economy of people who have preference orderings over leisure , a composite commodity N l y , and a good g targeted by the government. We will assume that people's preferences can be represented by a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function 2 , and initially that they are identical:
whereθ represents an individual's strength of preference for the target good relative to the other goods. Rho ( ρ ) is a positive monotonic transformation of the person's elasticity of substitution between the target and other goods, ranging from perfect flexibility ( ρ = 1), to Cobb Douglas ( ρ = 0), to Leontief ( ρ = -∞).
3 As we shall see, the value of rho plays a key role in determining how differences in income affect people's time allocation decisions.
The price of leisure is a person's wage, w, while the price of y is normalized to 1. The full money and time price of the target good at a given outlet is P g = wH + p, where p is the money unit price, and H is the waiting time required per unit of g purchased. 4 We assume initially that g cannot feasibly be resold once purchased. All individuals have an identical time endowment, T, which they can spend working L, in leisure ℓ, or in line (Hg). We assume that all income comes from labour, but do not explicitly model the allocation of labour hours to the production of y and g. Instead,
we take the supply of g as exogenous at M.
5
For ease of exposition, we shall start by assuming that g is available from only one outlet, with no potential for resale, and that all individuals face the same wage w.
An individual's problem is:
With interior solutions for any ρ ∈ (-∞ ,1), the corresponding supply and demand functions are: 
The isoprice line
The policy maker could set the money price just high enough to enable the market for the target good to clear without any queue, or To introduce income inequality, we first examine the effect of an increase in the (uniform) wage on the position of the isoprice line for a person at a sole outlet.
Consider first the intercepts. At the pure pricing intercept * * g p P p = , we differentiate (4) with respect to w. This yields
Examining (5), we see that
for all values of ρ ∈ (-∞, 1). Thus, under pure pricing, a wage increase for all individuals would cause demand for g to shift right, raising the money price needed to clear the market.
At the pure queuing intercept 
H (time price of g)
Fig. 1. A market-clearing isoprice line for a single outlet and wage group
Examining (6), we see that
for ρ =0, and
That is, if the outlet clears only by queuing, a higher wage would lower the equilibrium time price if the elasticity of substitution between goods were high (ρ>0), but raise it if that elasticity were low (ρ<0). Intuitively, this is because a higher wage has an income effect that makes people demand more of all goods, including the target good. But a higher wage also raises the opportunity cost of the target good when purchased only with time (as it does leisure), creating a substitution effect towards labour and y and away from demand for the target good or leisure. The income effect of a wage increase dominates the substitution effect when 0 ρ < , causing net demand for the target good to rise, and the equilibrating time price to rise. 
Two outlets without resale
Returning to our isoprice line in Fig.1 , we can now predict the effect of raising everyone's wage from w (redefined as ) to (5) and (6) and the steeper slope imply that an individual's isoprice line of market-clearing ( , ) H p combinations will rotate clockwise around a point in the positive quadrant, as shown in Fig. 2 . For ρ < 0, the signs of (5) and (6) and the steeper slope imply that the isoprice line will rotate clockwise around a point in the negative quadrant, as shown in Fig. 3 . More precisely, the new isoprice line will cross the original so long as its lower bound 
Similarly, if we continue to assume that resale is not possible.
At a 'queuing' outlet, the policy maker would set a lower money price, L p , to attract the poor, while at a 'pricing' outlet he would set a higher money price, H p , to attract the rich. The policy maker must distribute the supply of the target good M across the outlets, M q and M p , in proportion to the income distribution:
If the poor and rich self-select to their respective outlets, each outlet will clear according to its own version of (4). With supply at each outlet pre-set in proportion to distribution of earner types as in (9), the isoprice lines of rich and poor at each outlet will differ only in wage. Their isoprice lines will then cross under the same conditions as in our thought experiment for a single outlet in Figs 2 or 3.
At the queuing outlet, the policy maker is free to set the money price L p anywhere between and * ,min L p ** p . For example, it could be set at zero when ρ > 0, resulting in the outlet clearing by pure queuing, or formally at the where
At maximum, L p could be set at the unique combination that would simultaneously clear a proportionately stocked queuing outlet with poor people or a proportionately stocked pricing outlet with rich people,
The policy maker has similar flexibility in setting the money price at the pricing outlet. At maximum, H p could be set to clear the outlet without queuing when only rich people are in it, or the * pH p where
At minimum H p could be set at the ** p already defined in (11).
Before presenting our results, we describe finally how individuals choose between the queuing and pricing outlets to purchase the target good. An individual will choose the outlet that offers the lowest full price given his wage. With CES utility, the composition of that full price will affect the individual's time allocation between work and queuing, but not his demand for leisure. More formally, the individual's demand functions given in (3) are conditional on his choice of outlet.
Substituting these into utility yields indirect utility
It follows that for any ρ ∈(-∞,1),
if and only if * g g P P < % . We now have sufficient background to present our results.
Proposition 1 Suppose a society has two income levels, and a target good for which resale is not possible. If a policy maker creates two outlets, distributes the target good proportionally as in (9), and chooses money prices Once we have established that the rich and poor separate, it is easy to show that they purchase the same quantity of the target good.
Proposition 2 The separating equilibrium above equalizes consumption of the target good between rich and poor.
Proof With money prices set by the policy maker, the queuing time at the pricing and queuing outlets adjust such that and
From proportional allocation as in (9), it follows that
Propositions 1 and 2 show that a policy maker can accommodate two wage groups at two outlets with flexibility in setting money prices. queue, it turns out that he can achieve the same equal allocation of g using one outlet rather than two. To do so, he must set the single money price at the unique level identified in (11).
Proposition 3 There exists a pooled outlet with a unique at which both income groups face the same full price and consumption of 
To summarize, we have shown that when resale of a target good is not feasible, a policy maker can make its consumption independent of income by inducing different money and time prices for different income groups. We next examine the consequences for this mechanism's distributional outcome if the good can be resold.
Two outlets with resale
A potential problem with differential pricing emerges if the mechanism is applied to a good that can be resold. As illustrated by the vertical intercepts of the isoprice lines in Figs. 2 or 3, the (pure pricing equivalent) full price of g at the separating equilibrium without resale is higher for the rich, queuing outlet and reselling it to the rich could provide the poor with a higher utility than retaining it for own consumption, making both parties to the transaction better off. However specific egalitarianism would no longer be achieved, as final consumption of g would be higher among the rich than the poor. We pose the problem more formally below, adapting the resale model of Stahl and Alexeev (1985) , and propose an approach the policy maker could take to preserve specific egalitarianism when resale is feasible. . While the policy maker may precommit to a money or time price at each outlet, we assume for convenience that he sets the latter at , and allows the money prices to equilibrate.
11 An individual's problem, conditional on choice of outlet, becomes
, ,
For high wage individuals, the corresponding supply and demand functions are: 
where 
, ( )
, , 0.
As we show below, there exist a unique set of prices that satisfy equations (20)- (22) such that
w . This single resale market price b p % eliminates arbitrage across markets, but compared to the case without resale, results in a lower full price for the rich and higher full price for the poor.
More formally, the resale price b p %cannot be less than the price at the queuing 
To compare the equilibrium resale price to its level when resale was not possible, we assume that the policy maker fixes (20) and (21), it can be shown that 
, which would violate (21). Zero purchase, =0, together with the positive supply in the resale market (
The uniqueness of b p %follows from monotonicity of the demand functions for g.
It can be shown that at the equilibrium when resale is feasible, both rich and poor would prefer the market equilibrium with resale to the former allocation without resale. For the poor, substituting the demand functions of (19) 
This inequality was seen to hold above.
Since demand for the target good is falling in full price, it also follows that a given high wage individual will consume more at the market equilibrium with resale than at the former allocation, or
. A given low wage individual, facing a higher opportunity cost of retaining the target good, will consume less, or
. It follows that the poor will consume less of the target good than the rich, or
To preserve equal consumption of the target good when resale is feasible, we propose that the policy maker could structure sales so as to deliberately create transactions costs for either buyers or sellers who enter the resale market. For example, managers of campsites at popular national parks could mimic airlines by personalizing campsite passes with purchaser details. These details could then be verified using ID when the passes are presented for use. Those trying to use re-sold passes must then forge or borrow ID, which requires additional time and money expense.
More formally, we denote the per unit money and time transactions costs created for low wage sellers or high wage buyers as f m,i and f t,i , respectively, where i = L,H. We assume these costs depend linearly on the volume of g resold, though they could easily be modelled as independent of (positive) 
Substituting the low wage individual's resulting demand functions into his utility function, it can be shown that
where is defined as in (19). This inequality will hold if and only if
The policy maker could try to impose sufficient total per unit transactions costs 
As can be seen by examining (29), a high wage individual will be better off purchasing at least some g in the resale market, or Moving from the problem of resale to that of preference heterogeneity, we ask whether our mechanism can ensure that consumption will depend on relative strength of preference, even as it equalizes consumption across wage groups. For simplicity of exposition, we return to the assumption that resale is infeasible.
Heterogeneous preferences
People vary in their willingness-to-pay for a good because they differ in income, but also because they differ in relative strength of preference or need. Our mechanism can respect the latter difference, rather than imposing an equal distribution of the good to all. That is, we ask our mechanism to make consumption of the target good independent of income, but increasing in strength of preference.
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We introduce heterogeneous preferences by allowing that individuals may place a 'regular' θ R or a 'strong' weight θ S on the target good in utility in equation (1) As we showed in (13), individuals with any given strength of preference for the target good will choose between outlets based only on full price * g P . It follows that individuals with differing θ's but with an identical wage will choose the same outlet.
Their isoprice lines will be identical in equilibrium, except that the lower bound for someone with high preference strength θ S, will lie north-west of the lower bound for someone withθ
An example is provided in Fig. 5 below, where the dotted segment at the bottom of the high wage isoprice line represents money and time price combinations that would be feasible for someone with θ R ( ), but infeasible for someone with θ
Note that with heterogeneity, the distribution of preferences among the people at an outlet will affect the full price that brings the outlet into equilibrium. For example, if only low wage individuals inhabit an outlet with a supply of M q , there will exist a unique * g P that equates supply and demand: * * , ,
Differentiating (31), it can be shown that * / g L P s ∂ ∂ > 0. Intuitively, an increase in the proportion of individuals with a strong preference for the target good at an outlet will bid up the (H, p) combinations that clear it. This would shift out the isoprice line of an individual at that outlet, regardless of his preference strength.
Let us return to the two outlet case from our previous discussion. Would the high and low wage groups separate as before into 'pricing' and 'queuing' outlets offering high H p and low L p money prices? Graphically, the isoprice lines for rich and poor must cross at an combination that is feasible for all wage and preference types for a separating equilibrium to exist. That is, the isoprice lines must cross at an between (0, min{ }) so that the demand functions for the target good simultaneously satisfy
At one extreme, separating equilibria would not exist if the proportion of the poor with a strong taste for g, s L , were too high relative to the analogous proportion of the rich, s H . For a given s H , the proportion s L cannot exceed an upper bound of for to remain nonnegative, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . Intuitively, the greater the proportion of strong preference people at an outlet, the greater its full price, making other outlets with more tepid patrons more attractive. Thus, if s max L s ** H L were too high at the queuing outlet relative to s H at the pricing outlet, the isoprice lines would not intersect, and a marginal low wage person (of either preference strength) would prefer to switch to the pricing outlet.
At the other extreme, separating equilibria would not exist if s L were too low relative to s H, , or less than the lower bound s L min . This is because a sufficient fall in s L would shift the low wage isoprice line sufficiently inward to prevent the intersection of a low wage, high preference isoprice line with the high wage, high preference isoprice line. A marginal high wage person would then prefer to switch to the queuing outlet. Assuming neither extreme occurs, we may present our results. 
H , see Appendix 1 as before.
We turn next to ask whether this separating equilibrium will make consumption of g independent of income, but increasing in strength of preference. The queuing outlet will clear at the full price
which given proportional supply (9) can be expressed as
.
Similarly, the pricing outlet will clear at the full price 
Comparing (33) and (34), we see that the consumption of g is equalized across the average person of each income group. That is, equality of consumption will hold between income groups, but it is not necessarily the case that and . Intuitively, the problem is that the effect of preference strength on a person's demand for the target good,
∂ depends on variables such as full price, income, and preference distribution, each of which may differ across outlets. Thus, at the separating equilibrium, there is no reason to believe that individuals with a common θ at different outlets will purchase identical quantities of .
Fortunately, the equalization of average consumption across income groups places substantial constraints on inequality caused by income. In particular, differences in preference strength will dominate differences in income. ) Thus every exceeds every .
Finally, there will again be an equivalent pooled equilibrium at a single outlet that corresponds to our separating equilibrium. As with homogeneous preferences, this occurs at the unique where the isoprice line for individuals of each income group cross, as defined in (32). The reasoning is analogous to the proof of Proposition 3, and is omitted. 
Multiple outlets
Thus far, our analysis has been restricted to binary classifications of income and preference type. However, our results could readily be extended in a discrete framework to any countable finite number of wage levels and preference strengths. p ). More generally, it is anticipated that K income groups could be accommodated with K separating outlets, or with the largest integer lower than or equal to K/2 pooled outlets.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered the problem of a policy maker with the inkind distributional objective of 'specific egalitarianism,' or that access to a target good be made independent of income, but increasing in preference or need. This objective could result from good-specific distributional concerns in society at large, and the inability of the policy maker to distinguish high and low ability individuals in the standard tax and transfer system.
We described circumstances under which this objective could be achieved by making the good simultaneously available at parallel outlets charging different money and time prices. In particular, with two income groups, a policy maker could allocate a fixed supply of the target good at two outlets in proportion to the income distribution, set a high money price at one, and a low (even negative) money price at the other. Queuing time would equilibrate at each outlet. Those with a high wage would choose the outlet with a high money price and little or no waiting, and those with a low wage would choose the outlet with low money price and a substantial queue. Alternatively, the policy maker could induce an equivalent pooled equilibrium in which both income groups would be served at a single outlet. This equilibrium would feature a unique money and time price that each income group would find equivalent to the full price they would face at the separating equilibria.
We find that when resale is infeasible and preferences are homogeneous, our proposal exactly equalizes consumption of the target good across rich and poor. When preferences for the target good are heterogeneous, differential pricing equalizes the average consumption of the target good across income groups. At the individual level, those with a higher strength of preference for the good will always receive more of it than those with a lower strength, regardless of income. These results will hold so long as separating equilibria exist, which requires that the distribution of preferences for the target good not differ excessively between the rich and the poor.
While differential pricing involves the allocative inefficiency of optional queuing, it has the advantage over uniform disbursement that differences in relative preference orderings are respected. The policy maker could minimize queuing time by setting separate money prices such that high wage individuals would pay purely by money, and low wage individuals would pay the highest money price consistent with keeping high wage individuals out of their outlet.
The informational requirements of differential allocation are modest; the policy maker must know a population's income and preference distribution, but not an individual's. Even an exact knowledge of the preference distribution is not essential for separating equilibria, because the policy maker can set each outlet's money price within a range and achieve the same distribution of the target good.
Unfortunately, our mechanism suffers from several limitations. First, as Nichols et al. (1971) observed, the existence of non-labour income raises the possibility that wealthy retirees might choose outlets targeted to the poor. Second, if resale of the target good is feasible, all potential separating equilibria created by the mechanism are vulnerable because the full price faced by the poor is less than that faced by the rich. To prevent resale of the target good from poor to rich, the policy maker would need to purposefully raise the transactions costs of resale, either to low wage sellers or high wage buyers. This could be achieved by personalizing the purchase of the good with purchaser details that require verification with use.
Third, if the minimum queuing time for low wage individuals were substantial enough that the value of the target good to those individuals depreciated during the queue, the consumption of the rich would not exceed that of the poor in quantity, but it surely would in value. Lastly, our proposal requires the policy maker to bear the expense and complexity of administering multiple outlets. We note that real world target goods such as health care, public ferry tickets, hiking permits, postal services, and immigration processing offer at most a few price/time combinations.
Nonetheless, with judicious money pricing, even a few outlet choices will greatly diminish the disparity of income of individuals per outlet, and the inequality of consumption that results.
p p as chosen above will result in the separation of high and low wage individuals to their respective outlets, and therefore a unique set of full prices Suppose all the poor go to the queuing outlet and all the rich go to the pricing outlet.
As was shown by the signing of the partial derivatives in (5) and (6), the equilibrium isoprice line of the rich must cut the equilibrium isoprice line of the poor from above. This is repeated for ease of reference in p for positive or negative values of ρ, and moves the lower bound of the high wage isoprice line further to the south-west, together with the signs of (5) and (6), ensures that the potential range of money prices that can be set by the policy maker will increase. 10 The authors are grateful to a referee for pointing out this potential problem.
11 Setting time rather than money prices ensures that the money price at the pricing outlet can adjust to fully clear the outlet when demand there drops in response to the resale market. Setting the time price at the pricing outlet specifically at zero avoids the problem of identifying the maximum possible value that ensures that low wage individuals would prefer the queuing to the pricing outlet at black market equilibrium.
